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APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF
EQUIVALENTS TO MEANS PLUS FUNCTION
CLAIMS: WMS GAMING INC. V.
INTERNATIONAL GAME TECHNOLOGY
JOHN N. KANDARA
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, courts apparently concerned that the public’s
level of access to technology may be decreasing have sought to limit
the scope of patent claim coverage on several fronts. Generally
speaking, recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have encouraged narrower,
more literal readings of patent claim language, and thus less overall
protection for patent holders, in such areas as the use of functional
expressions in combination claims,1 the availability and proper
application of the doctrine of equivalents in patent infringement
cases,2 and the interpretation of words of ordinary usage within the
patent claims.3 The trend has been particularly obvious where the
doctrine of equivalents4 is applied to patent claims written in means

Copyright © 2000 by John N. Kandara.
1. See, e.g., O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that
“an element in a combination method or process claim may be recited as a step for performing a
specified function without the recital of acts in support of the function”).
2. See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28-29 (1997)
(“[T]he doctrine of equivalents must be applied to individual elements of the claim, not to the
invention as a whole.”).
3. See, e.g., Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(“Determining the limits of a patent claim requires understanding its terms in the context in
which they were used by the inventor, considered by the examiner, and understood in the field
of the invention.”).
4. See discussion infra Part I.C. Briefly, the doctrine of equivalents holds that a patent is
infringed not only when an accused device falls within a strict literal reading of the patent claims
but also when the accused device, though not literally within the patent claims, is only
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plus function format,5 with the courts eliminating availability of the
doctrine of equivalents for these claims.6
A recent high-stakes contest involving a patent for slot machines
seems to herald a reversal of this trend. In WMS Gaming Inc. v.
7
International Game Technology, a panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that a patent claim written in
means plus function language, although not literally infringed, had
been infringed under the doctrine of equivalents.8 In so doing, the
court held for the first time that the doctrine of equivalents can apply
to a means plus function claim where an element of an accused device
does not perform identically but only substantially the same function
as that claimed in the patent.9 By allowing the application of the
doctrine of equivalents in this case, the court not only resolved a
previously open question of law10 and halted the trend eliminating
availability of the doctrine of equivalents for claims written in the
means plus function format but also endorsed a broader, less literal
interpretation of patent claim language.
This Note will analyze the Federal Circuit’s evolving
jurisprudence on the application of the doctrine of equivalents to
patent claims written in the means plus function format. Part I
describes the background of U.S. patent law relevant to the case,
particularly the statutory authorization for means plus function
claims, the judicially created doctrine of equivalents, and how courts
insubstantially different from what is claimed in the patent.
5. See discussion infra Part I.B. Means plus function claims allow an inventor to claim an
element of his invention by describing the result it accomplishes or the function it serves, rather
than by describing the structure used to accomplish that result.
6. The trend is illustrated by cases such as Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem.
Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997), and Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145
F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Warner-Jenkinson is discussed infra at Part I.C, and Chiuminatta is
discussed infra at Part I.D.
7. 184 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
8. See id. at 1353-54.
9. Although the Federal Circuit had previously made a similar statement in dicta, see AlSite Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1320-21 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[U]nder § 112, ¶ 6, the
accused device must perform the identical function as recited in the claim element while the
doctrine of equivalents may be satisfied when the function performed by the accused device is
only substantially the same.”), there was no particular reason to assume that the court would
not instead continue to narrow availability of the doctrine of equivalents. See also Dawn Equip.
Co. v. Kentucky Farms Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1022 n.8 (Plager, J., additional views) (reserving the
question of “whether a § 112, ¶ 6 claim limitation is limited to the ‘specified function,’ or . . . can
also encompass an equivalent function under the doctrine of equivalents”).
10. See Dawn Equip. Co., 140 F.3d at 1022 n.8 (Plager, J., additional views) (resolving the
application of the doctrine of equivalents to a means plus function claim).
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have applied the doctrine of equivalents to claims written in the
means plus function format. Part II discusses the facts and holding of
the WMS Gaming case, and Part III summarizes the Federal Circuit’s
analysis of the proper application of the doctrine of equivalents to a
means plus function claim. Part IV argues that the decision reached
by the Federal Circuit on how the doctrine of equivalents should be
applied in cases where there is substantial similarity but no
identicality of function between an accused device and a patent claim
strikes an appropriate balance between protecting patent holders and
ensuring public notice of patent claims. Furthermore, this decision
will advance fundamental fairness and equity for patent holders and
the public, reduce the incentive to litigate collateral issues in patent
cases, and promote efficiency in claiming.
I. BACKGROUND
The issue raised in WMS Gaming involves two different but
somewhat confusingly related concepts within American patent law:
means plus function claims and the doctrine of equivalents. Each is
fundamentally related to different, and sometimes opposing, policy
rationales that underlie the patent system in the United States.11 To
comprehend the importance of the court’s decision in WMS Gaming,
then, one must first have a basic understanding of U.S. patent law.
A. Patent Basics
The courts have long been concerned with the scope of
protection afforded by patent claims. The patent system is designed
to promote the public good by encouraging invention.12 An inventor
who is willing to disclose to the public the new device or process he
has created is in return granted a temporary right to exclude others
from practicing the invention.13 This right allows the inventor to
prevent others from making, using, offering for sale, selling, or
importing the patented invention during the term of the patent.14

11. See infra notes 16-33 and accompanying text.
12. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
13. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994).
14. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994). The patent grant is frequently characterized as a
monopoly on the right to practice the invention. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW
OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 44, at 67 (1890) (“[T]he patent privilege is a true
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Because competitors may be prevented from exploiting the subject
matter claimed by the patent while it is in force, the patent allows the
patent holder, for a limited time, to charge a higher price for the use
of the invention than the holder would be able to obtain absent the
protection afforded by the patent.15
This ability to charge a higher price for the use of the invention
for a limited time theoretically promotes scientific progress in three
ways.16 First, the patent acts as an incentive to invent by ensuring that
those who spend their time and money on research and development
of new and useful devices or processes will be suitably compensated
for their efforts.17 Second, the patent acts as an incentive to disclose
inventions to the public by preventing commercial competitors of the
patent holder from copying the claimed invention without
permission.18 Finally, the patent acts as an incentive to innovate by
encouraging companies to invest whatever resources are necessary to

monopoly, granted in derogation of the common right.”). This characterization is arguably
erroneous in two regards. First, “the federal patent laws do not create any affirmative right to
make, use, or sell anything.” Leatherman Tool Group Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 131 F.3d 1011,
1015 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (restating the black-letter law as enunciated in Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55
U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1852) (“The franchise which the patent grants, consists altogether in
the right to exclude every one from making, using, or vending the thing patented, without the
permission of the patentee. This is all that he obtains by the patent.”)). Second, because the
patent gives its owner no right to practice the invention, the patent grant is not truly a
monopoly, not even a temporary one. See generally Giles S. Rich, Are Letters Patent Grants of
Monopoly?, 15 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 239 (1993) (tracing the history of patents and monopolies
and concluding that the rights conferred by a patent cannot correctly be considered a
monopoly). But see Giles Sutherland Rich, My Favorite Things, 35 IDEA 1, 4-5 (1994)
(retreating from his prior position and concluding that “[t]he fuel of the patent system is
monopoly power”).
15. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1021-22 (1989).
16. See id. at 1024, 1036-37.
17. See id. at 1024-26. Patents may also maximize the value to society of the investments
made in a particular area. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System,
20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 276 (1977):
[T]he potential gains from exclusive ownership are particularly large. No one is likely
to make significant investments searching for ways to increase the commercial value
of a patent unless he has made previous arrangements with the owner of the patent.
This puts the patent owner in a position to coordinate the search for technological
and market enhancement of the patent’s value so that duplicative investments are not
made and so that information is exchanged among the searchers.
18. See Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 1028-30; see also Kitch, supra note 17, at 277 (“Only in
the case of a patented product is a firm able to make the expenditures necessary to bring the
advantages of the product to the attention of the customer without fear of competitive
appropriation if the product proves successful.”).
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exploit an already existent and potentially lucrative invention that has
not yet been developed to the point of commercial feasibility.19
In order that the public will truly benefit from what Thomas
Jefferson called “the embarrassment of an exclusive patent,”20 an
inventor applying for a patent must explain the invention in a
specification,21 including one or more claims that delineate the exact
part or combination that he considers to be his invention.22 Once the
patent issues, it is published by the Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO),23 thus guaranteeing both disclosure to the general public of
the new knowledge the claimed invention represents and public
notice of what cannot be used during the patent term without
infringing upon the rights of the patent holder.24

19. See Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 1036-37 (“These additional investments [getting an
invention ready for commercial exploitation] may dwarf the initial research expenditures in
making the invention. The protection of a patent monopoly enhances the likelihood that a firm
will be willing to undertake these investments.”) (footnote omitted); see also Kitch, supra note
17, at 271 (“Many inventions . . . are patented in a commercially significant form, yet the
patented form is trivial in significance as compared to the later derived and improved
versions. . . . A review of the invention case studies . . . shows that the first patentable invention
frequently occurs years before the first significant commercial product.”) (citation omitted).
This theory, although only rarely relied upon by the courts, see Picard v. United Aircraft
Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 643 (2d Cir. 1942), has been offered by numerous commentators as a
justification for the patent system. See Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 1037 n.82 (noting how “a
patent monopoly is necessary to induce firms to invest in ‘innovation’—i.e., putting existing
inventions to practical use”).
20. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
Jefferson’s phrase exemplifies the implicit revulsion with which Americans have typically
regarded monopolies of any kind. See id. at 8.
21. See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1994); id. § 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is
most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
See also Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (“[T]he specification . . .
describe[s] the manner and process of making and using the patent so that any person skilled in
the patent’s art may utilize it.”).
22. See 35 U.S.C. § 112. The patent specification must “conclude with one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards
as his invention.” Id. The purpose of the claims is not to provide a technical description of the
invention but rather to point it out in a way that between distinguishes it from that which was
previously known and defines the area protected by the patent. See In re Vamco Mach. & Tool,
Inc., 752 F.2d 1564, 1577 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Thus, the patent claims are like the metes and
bounds in a deed that does not describe the land conveyed but merely defines which parcel it is.
See id.
23. See 35 U.S.C. § 153.
24. See 35 U.S.C. § 154.
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The scope of protection the claims recited in the patent provide
is of vital importance if the patent system is to fulfill its constitutional
purpose.25 The claims establish the metes and bounds of the right to
exclude that are secured by the patent.26 In other words, the claims
define the scope of protection or coverage. If the courts typically
construe patent claim language so literally that the coverage provided
is too narrow, then many inventors may be discouraged from
obtaining patents and may conceivably either exploit their discoveries
in secret27 or refrain from investing in expensive research and
development efforts.28 The courts have expressed concern that
because developing new technology is risky and expensive, failure to
provide adequate protection for patent owners could harm the
American economy.29
If the courts typically construe the patent claim language so
broadly that the coverage the claims provide to patent holders is
nebulous, however, the public notice function served by printing the
patent claims will be undermined.30 Because other inventors will
25. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
26. See Vamco Mach. & Tool, 752 F.2d at 1577 n.5.
27. See Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 1028.
28. See id. at 1024-25.
29. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1529-32 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (Newman, J., concurring), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997). As Judge Newman
explained:
Technologic innovation has driven the American economy, over the past century, to
the exclusion of virtually all other growth factors. Many students of technologic
change have explained that innovative activity is fundamental to industrial vigor,
developing new markets while enhancing productivity and competitiveness, thereby
strengthening and enriching the nation. . . . I need not belabor that the economic risk
in developing new technology is high, that the potential return must warrant the risk,
and that the return must pay for the failures as well as the successes. . . . The larger
public interest requires setting the optimum balance between the purpose of
supporting the innovator, in the national interest, and the purpose of supporting
improvement and competition, also in the national interest.
Id. (footnote omitted).
30. See London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991):
[I]f the public comes to believe (or fear) that the language of patent claims can never
be relied on, and that [protection is regularly extended] beyond the scope of the
claims, then claims will cease to serve their intended purpose. Competitors will never
know whether their actions infringe a granted patent.
One commentator has suggested that where claim language fails literally to capture
additional scope because of the patentee’s mere failure to recognize the potential value of one
part of an invention, the patentee should not be allowed to reclaim the additional scope through
the doctrine of equivalents, because the marginal cost of more careful patent prosecution to a
patentee is much less than the cost of resolving confusion about claim language to later
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never be sure exactly what the claim language will be deemed to
protect,31 the public will also be deprived of access to new knowledge
because those other inventors will be discouraged from finding
parallel but different means for achieving the same result as does the
patented invention.32 In addition, interpreting the patent claim
language too broadly could give the patentee an undeserved windfall
that encompasses future technological improvements.33
Judicial attempts to apply the patent laws to claim language
therefore reflect a continuing struggle to find the appropriate balance
between extremely broad interpretations that would overly insulate
patent owners from competition or new developments and narrow,
literal interpretations that would deter scientific progress because
inventors are unable to earn an appropriate return on their
investments.
B. Means Plus Function Claims
One particular area where the courts have struggled to find the
appropriate balance is that of means plus function claims.34 Although
every patent must distinctly claim the invention it seeks to protect,35
the patent claims are not required to describe precisely all the
elements that make up the invention.36 Some patents use a functional
rather than structural approach, describing the invention by what it
does (its function) rather than what it is.37 Many consider these
functional expressions, which are sometimes written as “means plus
function” claims, the best way to claim inventions in certain

inventors. See Joseph S. Cianfrani, Note, An Economic Analysis of the Doctrine of Equivalents,
1 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 50 (1997).
31. See Carson Pirie Scott, 946 F.2d at 1538.
32. See Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 1028 n.44; cf. Kitch, supra note 17, at 278 (“After a
patent is issued, other firms have an incentive to invent substitute technologies even if the
substitute technology is less efficient than the patented technology but can be produced more
cheaply than the existing royalty rate.”).
33. See MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 586
(1998).
34. Means plus function claims are also commonly referred to as “112 paragraph sixth”
claims, as they are authorized at 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6 of the current United States Code.
35. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
36. See id. para. 6.
37. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27 (1997)
(“Thus . . . an applicant can describe an element of his invention by the result accomplished or
the function served, rather than describing the item or element to be used (e.g., ‘a means of
connecting Part A to Part B,’ rather than ‘a two-penny nail’).”).
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contexts.38 The patent statutes obligate the judiciary to ensure that a
patent claiming a particular function, rather than describing the
elements that accomplish the function, provides enough information
to qualify as a true public disclosure of the invention.39 Two early
courts expressed this concern—in Wyeth v. Stone,40 where a patent
that claimed “cut[ting] ice of a uniform size, by means of an apparatus
worked by any other power than human” was held overly broad,41 and
in O’Reilly v. Morse,42 where Samuel Morse attempted to claim “the
use . . . of the electric . . . current . . . for marking or printing
intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at any distances.”43
38. See David W. Brownlee, The Scope of Equivalents Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 Should
Vary Depending on Importance of the Means-Plus-Function Recitation to the Invention as a
Whole, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 451, 451 (1999) (describing such patents as
“frequently the best, if not the only way, to appropriately cover an invention in its full scope”);
Mark D. Janis, Who’s Afraid of Functional Claims? Reforming the Patent Law’s § 112, ¶ 6
Jurisprudence, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 231, 235 & n.10 (1999)
(explaining that functional claims are particularly popular for software-related inventions
because the format is considered useful in meeting subject matter eligibility requirements). A
patent can be written in functional language without necessarily employing the means plus
function format authorized by 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6. See In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 664
(C.C.P.A. 1971) (emphasizing that “there is nothing intrinsically wrong with the use of
[functional] claim language”); Locklin v. Switzer Bros., Inc., 299 F.2d 160, 166 (9th Cir. 1961)
(upholding the validity of a patent described in functional terms); cf. K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A.,
191 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (analyzing functional language as a claim limitation).
39. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1.
40. 30 F. Cas. 723 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840).
41. Id. at 727. Justice Story wrote:
The specification states: “It is claimed, as new, to cut ice of a uniform size, by means
of an apparatus worked by any other power than human. The invention of this art, as
well as the particular method of the application of the principle, are claimed by the
subscriber” (Wyeth). It is plain, then, that here the patentee claims an exclusive title
to the art of cutting ice by means of any power, other than human power. Such a
claim is utterly unmaintainable in point of law. It is a claim for an art or principle in
the abstract, and not for any particular method or machinery by which ice is to be cut.
No man can have a right to cut ice by all means or methods, or by all or any sort of
apparatus, although he is not the inventor of any or all of such means, methods, or
apparatus.
Id.
42. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854).
43. Id. at 112. The last claim of Morse’s patent for the telegraph read, in full:
Eighth. I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery, or parts of
machinery described in the foregoing specification and claims; the essence of my
invention being the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which
I call electro-magnetism, however developed for marking or printing intelligible
characters, signs, or letters, at any distances, being a new application of that power of
which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer.
Id. The court invalidated the claim:
Indeed, if the eighth claim of the patentee can be maintained, there was no necessity
for any specification, further than to say that he had discovered that, by using the
motive power of electro-magnetism, he could print intelligible characters at any
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In 1946, the Supreme Court invalidated a patent written in the
means plus function format, holding that the patent claims were
insufficient to meet the statutory requirement for a full, clear, and
concise description of the invention.44 In response, when Congress
enacted the current Patent Act in 1952, it included the statutory
authorization for the language that became 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6.45
Section 112, paragraph 6 specifically authorizes inventors to use
functional rather than structural descriptions in patent claims.46
Congress did restrict the use of functional language in claims,
however;47 a functional claim is interpreted only to cover the structure
disclosed in the patent specification and equivalents of that
structure.48
The extent to which this statutory restriction should narrow the
scope of coverage provided by claims written in means plus function
format is still at issue in the courts.49 At first, the courts took a rather

distance. We presume it will be admitted on all hands, that no patent could have
issued on such a specification. Yet this claim can derive no aid from the specification
filed. It is outside of it, and the patentee claims beyond it.
Id. at 119-20.
44. See Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 9 (1946) (“The
language of the claim thus describes this most crucial element in the ‘new’ combination in terms
of what it will do rather than in the terms of its own physical characteristics or its arrangement
in the new combination apparatus.”). The Supreme Court’s objection was not to functional
claim language in general, but to its particular application at the “point of novelty.” Id. at 8.
45. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27 (1997)
(“Congress enacted § 112, ¶ 6 in response to Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker,
which rejected claims that ‘do not describe the invention but use conveniently functional
language at the exact point of novelty.’” (citation omitted)); Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke
Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New
Patent Act, Preface to 35 U.S.C.A. § 25 (1954) (Commentary), in support of the claim that § 112,
para. 6 was written in response to Halliburton).
46. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6 (1994):
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for
performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in
support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding
structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
47. See Valmont Indus., 983 F.2d at 1042 (“The second clause of the new paragraph [35
U.S.C. § 112, para. 6], however, places a limiting condition on an applicant’s use of means-plusfunction language. . . . This second clause confines the breadth of protection otherwise
permitted by the first clause.”).
48. See id.
49. See, e.g., Brownlee, supra note 38, at 454 (noting that the limits of section 112,
paragraph 6 are still undetermined in several important respects); Janis, supra note 38, at 235-38
(noting that the Federal Circuit has inconsistently applied characteristics of the doctrine of
equivalency to 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6).
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generous view of the scope allowed means plus function claims.50
When the Federal Circuit addressed the issue in 1985 in D.M.I., Inc.
51
v. Deere & Co., it reversed the lower court’s determination of noninfringement and held that a functional claim was not limited to the
exact structure described in the patent specification.52 The court said
that while patentees were required to disclose in the specification
some enabling means for accomplishing the function set forth in the
means plus function claim, “there is and can be no requirement that
applicants describe or predict every possible means of accomplishing
that function.”53
By 1991, however, the Federal Circuit had decided that a
narrower view was necessary. In Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc.,54 the
Federal Circuit held that the district court had erred by not
comparing the accused conveyor belt to the one disclosed in the
specification.55 It was insufficient, said the court, to hold that there
was patent infringement merely because the accused device had some
means that performed the function claimed in the patent.56 The
narrowing trend continued in Valmont Industries, Inc. v. Reinke
57
Manufacturing Co. Although the district court found that Reinke
had infringed Valmont’s patent for an irrigation system that watered
the corners of cultivated fields,58 the Federal Circuit reversed and held
that the statutory language permitting means plus function language
had a “string attached.”59 According to the court, the statutory
language does not broaden but rather “restricts the coverage of literal
claim language.”60 The patentee is limited to the exact structure

50. See, e.g., In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 212-13 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (holding that there “is
nothing intrinsically wrong” with defining some part of an invention in functional terms and that
functional language does not, “in and of itself, render[] a claim improper”).
51. 755 F.2d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
52. See id. at 1574 (“To interpret ‘means plus function’ limitations as limited to a particular
means set forth in the specification would be to nullify the provision of § 112 requiring that the
limitation shall be construed to cover the structure described in the specification and
equivalents thereof.”).
53. Id.
54. 939 F.2d 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
55. See id. at 1536.
56. See id.
57. 983 F.2d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
58. See id. at 1041.
59. Id. at 1042.
60. Id. “Section 112, ¶ 6, limits the broad language of means-plus-function limitations in
combination claims . . . .” Id. at 1043-44.
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disclosed in the specification and its structural equivalents,61 rather
than to any structure that would accomplish substantially the same
result.62
The Federal Circuit further clarified the scope accorded means
plus function claims in In re Donaldson Co.,63 where it held that
“paragraph six applies regardless of the context in which the
interpretation of means-plus-function language arises, i.e., whether as
part of a patentability determination in the PTO or as part of a
validity or infringement determination in a court.”64 In other words,
the means plus function language restricted both the patentee when
asserting the patent against an alleged infringer in court and the PTO
when determining whether a patent application should be approved.
Finally, in B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbot Laboratories,65 the Federal
Circuit held that where a drawing was included in the patent
specification and clearly showed a structure but did not explain how
that structure related to the function, the invention was insufficiently
disclosed.66
Because courts are concerned with the public notice function of
patents and with the potential for vague or ambiguous claims that do
not properly disclose inventions, patent claims written in functional
language, though permitted, are more narrowly construed than claims
written in structural terms. Patentees are limited to the exact
structure disclosed in the specification and its structural equivalents
when claiming infringement and are required to link the function
recited in the patent claim to some particular structure disclosed
elsewhere in the patent.

61. See id. at 1043.
62. See id. (explaining that despite the use of the word “equivalent” in section 112, “[a]
determination of section 112 equivalence does not involve the equitable tripartite test of the
doctrine of equivalents”). In other words, one cannot patent a function or a result; one can only
patent tangible parts or steps for performing that function or achieving that result.
63. 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
64. Id. at 1193.
65. 124 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
66. See id. at 1424:
[S]tructure disclosed in the specification is “corresponding” structure only if the
specification or prosecution history clearly links or associates that structure to the
function recited in the claim. This duty to link or associate structure to function is the
quid pro quo for the convenience of employing § 112, ¶ 6.
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C. The Doctrine of Equivalents
As with means plus function claims, the doctrine of equivalents is
a method by which the courts have struggled to balance two
competing public policies: on the one hand, giving patent claim
language a broader and more protective interpretation encourages
invention, but on the other, a narrower, more literal interpretation
ensures that the public notice function is served and protects
competing products. The doctrine of equivalents is an equitable
remedy designed to broaden the protection afforded to patent
owners.67 The courts created the doctrine of equivalents in the midnineteenth century68 after recognizing that a competitor could adopt
(or steal) the essence of a patented invention while making enough
minor or obvious changes to carry the product outside the literal
scope of the patent claims.69 Though it does not extend to patent
claims,70 the doctrine of equivalents extends the protection not
otherwise provided by a literal interpretation of the claim language
by declaring that a patent is infringed not only when an accused

67. See, e.g., 60 AM. JUR. 2D Patents § 933 (Supp. 2000) (listing law review articles and
cases on the doctrine of equivalents). Although the Federal Circuit has on several occasions
made explicit statements that the doctrine of equivalents is an equitable remedy, see, e.g.,
London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (referring to the
doctrine of equivalents as an “equitable doctrine”); American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson &
Johnson, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1954, 1956 (1992) (“[T]he doctrine of equivalents is . . . . an equitable
remedy.”), the court has held that the word “equity” as used in the Graver Tank decision refers
only to a sense of general fairness. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62
F.3d 1512, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Therefore, the issue of equivalence does not invoke the
traditional equitable powers of the English courts and is decided by the jury. See id.
68. See Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 343 (1853) (“The exclusive right to the
thing patented is not secured, if the public are at liberty to make substantial copies of it, varying
its form or proportions.”).
69. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950):
[C]ourts have also recognized that to permit imitation of a patented invention which
does not copy every literal detail would be to convert the protection of the patent
grant into a hollow and useless thing. Such a limitation would leave room for—indeed
encourage—the unscrupulous copyist to make unimportant and insubstantial changes
and substitutions in the patent which, though adding nothing, would be enough to
take the copied matter outside the claim, and hence outside the reach of law.
70. See Wilson Sporting Goods v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (“To say that the doctrine of equivalents extends or enlarges the claims is a contradiction
in terms. The claims—i.e., the scope of patent protection as defined by the claims—remain the
same and application of the doctrine expands the right to exclude to ‘equivalents’ of what is
claimed.”).
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device contains elements identical to those described by the patent
claims but also when it is “equivalent” to the patented device.71
Although the courts created and nurtured the doctrine of
equivalents, they have struggled to define exactly what an
“equivalent” is. In 1950, the U.S. Supreme Court described the
doctrine of equivalents in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde
72
Air Products Co. as an inquiry to determine whether the alleged
infringing device “‘performs substantially the same function in
substantially the same way to obtain the same result’” as the device
claimed by the patent.73 Commonly known as the “function-wayresult” or “tripartite” test, this language from Graver Tank embodied
the doctrine of equivalents for much of the rest of the century.74
Although the function-way-result test seems straightforward
theoretically, in practice it proved difficult to apply,75 especially in
71. For example, a patent that claimed the use of a fine threaded screw to attach two other
elements of the invention could not be circumvented by using a coarse-threaded screw, nail, or
rivet. Winans provides a more substantial application of the doctrine. The plaintiff invented and
patented a railroad car, shaped like a cone, that distributed loads more effectively than other
freight cars of the day and was therefore more economical to operate. See Winans, 56 U.S. (15
How.) at 339. After observing the new design, the defendant produced a similar car, which was
octagonal with a pyramidal base. See id. at 340. Because the patent only claimed cars shaped
like the frustum of a cone, there was no literal infringement of the patent even though the
defendant had clearly copied the essence of the plaintiff’s invention. See id. The Supreme Court
held that the patent had been infringed under the doctrine of equivalents. See id. at 343-44.
72. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
73. Id. at 608 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)). Today
the Federal Circuit prefers to use the phrase “insubstantial differences”; that is to say that an
accused product infringes under the doctrine of equivalents where “the differences between that
which is claimed and its embodiment in the accused composition are insubstantial.” Upjohn Co.
v. Mova Pharm. Corp., No. 99-1092, 2000 WL 1277666, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 11, 2000). The
differences between the element of the accused product are insubstantial where “the element in
the accused composition performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way
to obtain substantially the same result as the claimed element.” Id. Equivalence is a question of
fact to be determined by the jury. See id.
The courts have recognized that the phrase “insubstantial differences” is not particularly
helpful. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997) (“[T]he
insubstantial differences test offers little additional guidance as to what might render any given
difference ‘insubstantial.’”); Dawn Equip. Co. v. Kentucky Farms Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1015-16
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (recognizing the shortcomings of the insubstantial differences test); id. at 1020
(Plager, J., additional views):
However many variations there are in the words we use to describe the criteria by
which to determine when something in fact is the “equivalent” of something else, the
basic notion of equivalence does not vary. An equivalent is something that is “equal
in force or amount,” “like in signification or import,” [or] “synonymous.”
(citations omitted).
74. See ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 33, at 900.
75. See id:
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newly emerging areas such as biotechnology and computer software.76
The inability for companies to predict how the doctrine of equivalents
might be applied to their own patents or the patents of their
competitors arguably inhibited research and development efforts,77
and the difficulty led some commentators to argue that the doctrine
of equivalents should be abolished altogether.78 Others debated
whether the doctrine should be applied to the “invention as a whole”
or on an “element-by-element” basis.
Initially, the Federal Circuit applied the function-way-result test
to the “invention as a whole.”79 In Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United
80
States, Hughes claimed the United States had infringed its patented
method for controlling the attitude of a geosynchronous satellite.81
Hughes had patented a method for controlling a satellite’s on-orbit
position,82 and several elements of the patent were written in means
plus function language.83 In practice, Hughes claimed a method in
[E]xperience did not refine this standard, but instead demonstrated that its
extraordinary vagueness was of scant use in resolving actual infringement cases.
Litigants placed vastly different meanings upon the terms “function,” “way,” and
“result,” with patentees reading this [sic] terms broadly and accused infringers
narrowly.
Id. The apparent simplicity of the tripartite test is thus unfortunately the opposite of the North
Carolina motto, “Esse quam videri” (“To be, rather than to seem”).
76. See Hilton Davis Chem., 62 F.3d at 1518 (“As technology becomes more sophisticated,
and the innovative process more complex, the function-way-result test may not invariably
suffice to show the substantiality of the differences.”).
77. See Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent
Law: Questions that Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 682-83 (1989):
[U]ncertainty about the scope of patent protection hinders both patent holders and
potential defendants from assessing the possible outcome of litigation or from making
other business decisions, such as the direction that research and development efforts
should take. . . . The uncertainty generated by the doctrine of equivalents frustrates
and chills the activities of . . . other inventors, who must be concerned about whether
their efforts [to “design around” a patent] will be met by an infringement suit based
on the amorphous doctrine of equivalents.
(footnote omitted).
78. See, e.g., Warren T. Jessup, The Doctrine of Equivalents, 54 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 248,
270 (1972) (“The doctrine is basically unsound and unfair to the patentee’s competitors. Its
continued existence is a reproach of the patent bar.”).
79. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1571 (Fed.
Cir. 1986).
80. 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
81. See id. at 1356. A geosynchronous satellite has an orbital period equaling the Earth’s
rotational period. In other words, the satellite stays at the same point on the horizon as the
Earth turns beneath it. See id. at 1352. Pointing the satellite’s receivers and antennae requires
the ability to control the satellite’s attitude, or the direction in which it is facing in space. See id.
82. See id. at 1352-54.
83. See id. at 1355. The case centered around the meaning of three paragraphs in the first
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which a ground crew would receive position telemetry from the
satellite, calculate the time and duration of station-keeping
maneuvers that would correct the satellite’s attitude, and then
command the satellite to fire its maneuvering thrusters at the
calculated times.84 The government’s satellites, on the other hand,
used an onboard computer rather than a ground crew to calculate and
command the station-keeping maneuvers, and therefore did not
transmit data to an external source or receive and respond to control
signals from that source.85 Comparing the two methods as a whole, the
Federal Circuit found that the onboard computer and the ground
crew performed substantially the same function in substantially the
same way to achieve the same result.86 Thus, the government had
infringed Hughes’s patent under the doctrine of equivalents.87
This broad application of the doctrine of equivalents disturbed
many, however, who felt that the threat of litigation posed by
uncertainty about the scope of subject matter covered by patent
claims stifled, rather than promoted, technological advances.
Responding to these concerns, a divided Federal Circuit narrowed
the doctrine of equivalents in Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland,
88
Inc. Pennwalt owned the patent on a mechanical device with a
network of hard-wired electrical components that sorted fruit by
color and weight.89 The patent claimed a means of continuously
indicating the positions of each item on the conveyor belt.90 DurandWayland’s device also sorted fruit by color and weight, but it used a
computer program that stored the data and did not need to track item
locations.91 The district court compared each element claimed in
Pennwalt’s patent to an alleged substitute in the Durand-Wayland
sorter. It found that because Pennwalt’s hard-wired system tracked
item locations and Durand-Wayland’s computer did not, the two
claim, all of which were written in means plus function language. See id. at 1364. For example,
paragraph (e) claimed an apparatus comprising a “means disposed on said body [the satellite]
for providing an indication to a location external to said body of the instantaneous spin angle
position of said body about said axis and the orientation of said axis with reference to a fixed
external coordinate system.” Id.
84. See id. at 1360-61.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 1366.
87. See id.
88. 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc).
89. See id. at 933.
90. See id. at 938.
91. See id. at 936.
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devices did not perform substantially the same function.92 Affirming
the finding of non-infringement, the Federal Circuit rejected the
“invention as a whole” approach and held that the doctrine of
equivalents could only be applied on an “element-by-element” basis.93
The decision was immediately controversial: the dissent and some
commentators argued that the doctrine should not be narrowed and
that the majority was improperly overruling Supreme Court
precedent,94 but other commentators continued to insist that the
doctrine had outlived its usefulness and should be abolished
altogether, rather than merely limited.95
The debate about the proper legal standard was not settled for
another decade. In 1997, the Supreme Court again felt the need to
address the scope of coverage provided by the doctrine of
equivalents, which the Court declared had “taken on a life of its own,
unbounded by the patent claims.”96 Observing that a broad
application of the doctrine “conflicts with the definitional and publicnotice functions of the statutory claiming requirement,”97 the Court
confined its application to an element-by-element comparison of the
claimed invention and the accused device.98 The Court also invited
92. See id. at 935-36.
93. Id. at 935.
94. See id. at 940 (Bennett, J., dissenting in part):
The majority facially retains the historical test set forth in Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v.
Linde Air Prods. Co. for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents by stating
that infringement in such instances may be found if an accused device performs
substantially the same overall function or work, in substantially the same way, to
obtain substantially the same overall result as the claimed invention. But in practical
effect, the majority has eviscerated the underlying rationale of the Graver Tank test
by requiring, under the doctrine of equivalents, an exact equivalent for each element
of the claimed invention.
(footnote and citations omitted). Some commentators agreed with Judge Bennett that Graver
Tank required the “as a whole” approach. See Gary S. Levenson, Note, An Element-By-Element
Analysis of the Doctrine of Equivalents in the Court Of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 38
DRAKE L. REV. 389, 402-04 (1988/1989); Frank S. Molinaro, Note, Pennwalt Corp. v. DurandWayland, Inc.—The Federal Circuit Redefines the Doctrine of Equivalents, 38 DEPAUL L. REV.
787, 808-10 (1989).
95. See, e.g., Ronald D. Hantman, Doctrine of Equivalents, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 511, 550 (1988):
[T]he Pennwalt decision did not go far enough. It should also have retreated from the
doctrine of equivalents of Graver Tank. The Graver Tank decision contradicted the
previous one hundred years of Supreme Court precedents and the Pennwalt court
should have considered it overruled by the last paragraph of Section 112, 35 U.S.C.
112(6), of the Patent Act of 1952.
96.
97.
98.

Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28-29 (1997).
Id. at 29.
See id. at 29-30.
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lower courts, particularly the Federal Circuit, to impose additional
limitations that would narrow the application of the doctrine of
equivalents.99
D. Application of the Doctrine of Equivalents to Means Plus
Function Claims
Both the doctrine of equivalents and means plus function claims
include the notion of “equivalence,”100 and the overlap has frequently
caused confusion in the lower courts.101 One of the first areas where
the Federal Circuit limited the doctrine of equivalents was in its
application to claims written in the means plus function format.102 In
103
Dawn Equipment Co. v. Kentucky Farms Inc., Judge Plager signaled
that he was willing to clarify matters by placing further restrictions
upon the doctrine of equivalents in cases involving means plus
function claims.104 Shortly thereafter,105 a Federal Circuit panel did
impose additional restrictions on the application of the doctrine to

99. See id. at 39 n.8.
100. As discussed supra Part II.B, a case of literal infringement of a means plus function or
35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6 claim is made out when the accused device has a function identical to
that claimed by the patent and encompasses structure identical or equivalent to that described in
the specification. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6 (1994). If there is no literal infringement, an
accused device may still infringe under the doctrine of equivalents if it is “equivalent” to the
claimed device when compared element-by-element using the “insubstantial differences” or
“function-way-result” tests. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39-40.
101. See, e.g., Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 102 F.3d 1214, 1222-23 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (using the doctrine of equivalents to evaluate the equivalence of two similar, but not
identical, products); Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1043 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (“[T]he word ‘equivalent’ in § 112 should not be confused, as it apparently was here, with
the ‘doctrine of equivalents.’” (quoting D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed.
Cir. 1985))).
102. See Jason Schultz, Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts Inc. v. Cardinal Industries, Inc. &
Dawn Equip. Co. v. Kentucky Farms, Inc., 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 173, 174 (1999).
103. 140 F.3d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
104. See id. at 1018-22 (Plager, J., additional views). Judge Plager opined:
I believe that the practice of claiming under § 112, ¶ 6 would be much improved if we
adhered to the proposition that the “equivalents” of “structure, material, or acts
described in the specification” are those found to be within the scope of that term as
it is used in § 112, ¶ 6, and not elsewhere. Accordingly, the separate judicially-created
doctrine of equivalents would have no application to those aspects of [elements]
drawn in means-plus-function form.
Id. at 1021-22 (Plager, J., additional views).
105. Chiuminatta was decided on May 14, 1998, only a few weeks after Dawn Equipment
was decided on March 24, 1998.
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means plus function claims in Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v.
106
Cardinal Indus., Inc.
The Chiuminatta panel107 created a bright-line rule that the
doctrine of equivalents is never available when the alternative
structure accused of infringing a means plus function claim is based
on technology available at the time the patent was issued.108 Judge
Lourie asserted that the doctrine of equivalents exists only because
the future is unpredictable and technological advances can produce
close variants of the structure disclosed in a patent already issued.109
Alternative structures based on technology already in existence at the
time a patent issued, however, could easily have been disclosed in the
original patent specification.110 The failure of the patent applicant to
disclose such alternative structures, reasoned the panel, leads to the
conclusion that the patent holder did not consider them equivalent to
the structure disclosed by the patent at the time of issuance and
therefore should not be allowed to claim their equivalence in a later
infringement proceeding.111 Thus, the trend toward restricting the

106. 145 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
107. The panel included Circuit Judges Lourie, Michel, and Plager. See id. at 1305.
108. See id. at 1310-11. This result reversed the previous practice of the Federal Circuit. In
Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc), the accused
device used microprocessor technology available at the time Pennwalt applied for its patent. See
id. at 941 n.4 (Bennett, J., dissenting in part). Both the majority and dissent agreed that, had
Durand-Wayland merely substituted a microprocessor for Pennwalt’s hard-wired circuitry,
Pennwalt could have made out an infringement case under the doctrine of equivalents. See id. at
935; id. at 941 n.4 (Bennett, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is clear that an equivalent can be found in
technology known at the time of the invention, as well as in subsequently developed
technology.” (citing Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1581
(Fed. Cir. 1984))).
109. See Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1310:
The doctrine of equivalents is necessary because one cannot predict the future. Due
to technological advances, a variant of an invention may be developed after the
patent is granted, and that variant may constitute so insubstantial a change from what
is claimed in the patent that it should be held to be an infringement. Such a variant,
based on after-developed technology, could not have been disclosed in the patent.
Even if such an element is found not to be a § 112, ¶ 6, equivalent because it is not
equivalent to the structure disclosed in the patent, this analysis should not foreclose it
from being an equivalent under the doctrine of equivalents.
110. See id. at 1311 (“[G]iven the prior knowledge of the technology asserted to be
equivalent, it could readily have been disclosed in the patent.”).
111. See id.:
There is no policy-based reason why a patentee should get two bites at the apple. If
he or she could have included in the patent what is now alleged to be equivalent, and
did not, leading to a conclusion that an accused device lacks an equivalent to the
disclosed structure, why should the issue of equivalence have to be litigated a second
time?
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application of the doctrine of equivalents to means plus function
claims continued.
II. WMS GAMING INC. V. INTERNATIONAL GAME TECHNOLOGY112
The Federal Circuit soon found another opportunity to refine the
application of the doctrine of equivalents to means plus function
claims. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
held that WMS Gaming literally infringed IGT’s patent, and WMS
Gaming appealed the ruling.113 In the resulting decision, the Federal
Circuit would, for the first time, decide how the doctrine of
equivalents would apply to means plus function claims when the
function claimed in the patent and the function of the allegedly
infringing device were only substantially similar, rather than identical.
A. The Facts
Defendant International Game Technology (IGT) owned United
States Patent No. 4,448,419 (the Telnaes patent), which claims a slot
machine that appears to be a standard mechanical slot machine but is
capable of decreasing the odds of winning.114 Unlike standard
mechanical slot machines, where the odds are equal that a reel will
stop in any given position, the Telnaes slot machine controls the reels
electronically to adjust the odds that certain reel stop positions will be
selected.115 When the machine is played, the control circuitry
determines the reel stop position randomly and then stops the reel at
that position.116 The reel stop position is chosen by selecting a random
number from a range greater than the number of stop positions on
the reel.117 The random numbers are non-uniformly mapped to the
reel stop positions; because the range is greater than the number of
actual reel stop positions, some reel stop positions are represented by
more than one random number.118 The non-uniform mapping allows

112. 184 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
113. See id. at 1342.
114. See id. at 1342-43.
115. See id. at 1343.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id. For example, the random number generator could be programmed to choose a
number between 1 and 50 where the reel only has 20 reel stop positions. Non-uniform mapping
means that some reel stop positions may have only one random number assigned to them, while
others may have several. See id.
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the machine’s owner to decrease the probability, and thus increase
the potential payoff, of any particular combination of reel stop
positions.119 The Telnaes patent is written in means plus function
format and claims a slot machine including “means for assigning a
plurality of numbers” to stop positions such that at least one stop
position is represented by more than one number and “means for
randomly selecting one of said plurality of assigned numbers.”120 The
Telnaes patent discloses a microprocessor or computer as the means
of performing the “means for assigning” element and also discloses
an algorithm controlling the assignment of numbers to reel stop
positions.121
Nine years after the Telnaes patent was issued, virtual reel slot
machines had become widely accepted in the market,122 and plaintiff,
WMS Gaming Inc. (WMS), introduced its own version called the
WMS 400.123 Like the Telnaes invention, the WMS 400 controls the
reels electronically to manipulate the odds of winning.124 Though the
WMS 400 machine also uses a microprocessor or computer to assign
random numbers, it is programmed with a different algorithm from
the one disclosed in the Telnaes patent.125 Rather than determining
the reel stop positions and then calculating the resultant payoff, the
119. See id. For example, assume a mechanical slot machine reel has 20 stop positions with 9
cherries, 6 oranges, 4 “lucky number” 7s, and only one gold bar. On any given pull of the lever,
the odds of getting a gold bar on that reel are therefore 1/20, or 5%, and the odds of hitting the
jackpot by getting three gold bars—one on each reel—are (1/20)*(1/20)*(1/20) = 1/8000, or
0.0125%. If the same reel were electronically controlled, those odds can be changed drastically.
Assume a random-number generator chooses a number between 1 and 50 for each reel. Given
non-uniform mapping, random numbers 1 to 5 are mapped to reel stop position 1 (a cherry), 6
to 8 are mapped to reel stop position 2 (another cherry), and so forth. Only random number 50
is mapped to reel stop position 20—the gold bar. The odds of getting three gold bars, and thus
the jackpot, are now (1/50)*(1/50)*(1/50) = 1/125,000, or 0.0008%.
120. Id. at 1346. Both parties agreed that claim 1 controlled the case. See id. Claim 1 reads:
1. A game apparatus, comprising: a reel mounted for rotation about an axis through a
predetermined number of radial positions; means to start rotation of said reel about
said axis; indicia fixed to said reel to indicate the angular rotational position of said
reel; means for assigning a plurality of numbers representing said angular positions of
said reel, said plurality of numbers exceeding said predetermined number of radial
positions such that some rotational positions are represented by a plurality of
numbers; means for randomly selecting one of said plurality of assigned numbers; and
means for stopping said reel at the angular position represented by said selected
number.
Id. at 1346-47.
121. See id. at 1347-48.
122. See id. at 1343-44.
123. See id. at 1344.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 1350.

KANDARA

01/18/01 4:54 PM

2000] APPLICATION OF DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

907

WMS 400 first calculates the payoff and then chooses reel stop
positions that represent that payoff.126 The WMS 400 calculates the
payoff by using a random number generator to select two numbers,
mapping the numbers to two payoff multipliers, and then multiplying
the payoff multipliers together.127 Once the payoff is calculated, a
third random number is generated and determines the reel stop
positions corresponding to the payoff amount.128
After the introduction of the WMS 400, IGT sent WMS a ceaseand-desist letter claiming that the new machine violated the Telnaes
patent.129 When WMS responded by seeking a declaratory judgment
for non-infringement and invalidity in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, IGT counterclaimed for willful
infringement.130 After a bench trial, the district court held that the
Telnaes patent was not invalid and that WMS had willfully infringed
the patent both literally and under the doctrine of equivalents.131 The
court later ordered WMS to pay a damage award, which, after tripling
for willful infringement, exceeded $30 million.132 WMS appealed the
judgment of liability.133
B. The Holding
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the
lower court’s finding of literal infringement but affirmed the finding
of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.134 The court agreed
that there were only insubstantial differences between assigning and
selecting combinations of single numbers and assigning and selecting
single numbers135 and held that an accused device may infringe under
the doctrine of equivalents, even when its function is not identical to
that disclosed in the patent.136

126. See id. at 1344.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 1345.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 1345-46.
132. See id. at 1345.
133. See id. at 1346. WMS also appealed the amount of damages and the district court’s
denial of a new trial, but neither issue is relevant for the purposes of this Note. See id.
134. See id. at 1354.
135. See id. at 1353-54 & n.7.
136. See id. at 1353.
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III. THE WMS GAMING COURT’S ANALYSIS
Judge Schall, writing for the WMS Gaming panel,137 began the
court’s infringement analysis by noting that all of the disputed claims
were written in the means plus function format authorized by 35
U.S.C. § 112, para. 6.138 Therefore, a finding of literal infringement
would require that “‘the accused device . . . employ means identical to
or the equivalent of the structures, material, or acts described in the
patent specification’” and that “‘[t]he accused device . . . perform the
identical function as specified in the claims.’”139 The court then
proceeded to construe the disputed elements of claim 1, which both
parties had acknowledged controlled the issue of infringement.140
A. Claim Construction
The first dispute revolved around exactly what was claimed by
the patent language “means for assigning a plurality of numbers
representing said angular positions of said reel, said plurality of
numbers exceeding said predetermined number of radial positions
such that some rotational positions are represented by a plurality of
numbers.”141 When construing the “means for assigning” element, the
district court had held that it covered any mathematical method for
determining correspondence between the randomly selected numbers
and the reel stop positions.142 The Federal Circuit panel agreed with
WMS that this interpretation was overly broad.143 Explaining that
once a general purpose computer has been programmed to follow a
specific set of instructions it is no longer a general purpose computer
but instead a special purpose computer,144 the panel held that where a
means plus function claim discloses a general purpose computer and a
specific algorithm that the computer is programmed to perform, “the
137. The panel included Judges Rich, Rader, and Schall. See id. at 1342. Because Judge Rich
passed away shortly after oral arguments, only Judges Rader and Schall decided the case. See id.
at 1342 n.*.
138. See id. at 1347.
139. Id. (quoting Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1042 (Fed. Cir.
1993)).
140. See id. at 1346.
141. Id. at 1347.
142. See id. at 1348 (citing WMS Gaming Inc. v. International Game Tech., No. 94 C 3062,
1996 WL 539112, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 1996)).
143. See id.
144. See id. (citing In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc)).
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disclosed structure is not the general purpose computer, but rather
the special purpose computer programmed to perform the disclosed
algorithm.”145 The structure disclosed for the Telnaes patent’s “means
for assigning,” then, was limited to a microprocessor programmed to
implement the specific algorithm disclosed in the Telnaes patent.146
The second disputed element of claim one involved the “means
for randomly selecting one of said plurality of assigned numbers.”147
The court held that the function claimed was randomly selecting one
of the numbers assigned by the “means for assigning” discussed
above and that the structure disclosed to carry out this function was a
microprocessor programmed to generate random numbers.148
The last disputed element, the “means for stopping said reel at
the angular position represented by said selected number,” was at
issue only because it depended on the construction of the two
previous elements.149 Both parties agreed that the claimed function
was stopping the reel at the position corresponding to the “means for
randomly selecting” element and that the structure disclosed to carry
out this function was a brake.150
B. Literal Infringement
Claim construction complete, the court determined that the
WMS 400 did not literally infringe claim 1 of the Telnaes patent.151
The court began by comparing the structure disclosed in the Telnaes
patent to that employed by the WMS 400.152 Observing that the
structure disclosed in claim 1 of the Telnaes patent as the “means for
assigning” element was limited to a microprocessor programmed with
the algorithm disclosed in the Telnaes patent and that the WMS 400
used a microprocessor programmed with a different algorithm, the
court held that the two structures were not identical.153
Because 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6 only requires that the structure
of an accused device be equivalent to that recited by a means plus

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 1349.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1349 & n.5.
Id. at 1349.
See id. at 1352.
See id. at 1350.
Id. at 1350-51.
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function claim, though, the court compared the two algorithms to
determine whether the differences between them were
insubstantial.154 The Telnaes algorithm identified each reel stop
position with a single number randomly selected from a plurality of
numbers.155 In contrast, the WMS 400 algorithm identified reel stop
positions with a combination of single numbers randomly selected
from a plurality of combinations of single numbers.156 The Federal
Circuit panel held that expert testimony that “the difference between
assigning and selecting single numbers and assigning and selecting
combinations of single numbers is insubstantial” was sufficient to
affirm the district court’s finding that the two structures were
equivalent.157
The panel reversed the district court’s finding of literal
infringement, however, because it held that the function of the WMS
400 microprocessor was not identical to the function recited in the
Telnaes patent.158 The function claimed by the “means for assigning”
and “means for selecting” elements of claim 1 is assigning and
selecting single numbers.159 The WMS 400, on the other hand, assigns
and selects combinations of numbers.160 Thus, the WMS 400 “does not
perform a function identical to that of claim 1 of the Telnaes
patent.”161 In summary, although the WMS 400 used a microprocessor
with a structure equivalent to that disclosed by the Telnaes patent,
the WMS 400’s microprocessor did not have an identical function as
required by 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6, and therefore the WMS 400 did
not literally infringe claim 1 of the Telnaes patent.
C. Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents
Although it found no literal infringement, the Federal Circuit
panel affirmed the district court’s finding of infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents.162 Judge Schall observed that even when an
accused device does not literally infringe a patent claim, it may still
154. See id. at 1351.
155. See id. at 1352.
156. See id.
157. Id. In other words, the district court’s finding of insubstantial differences between the
accused device and the claimed invention was not clearly erroneous. See id. at 1353.
158. See id. at 1352.
159. Id. at 1349-50, 1352.
160. See id. at 1344, 1352.
161. Id. at 1352.
162. See id. at 1354.
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infringe under the doctrine of equivalents “if the differences between
the claim and the accused device are insubstantial.”163 The district
court had found that differences between the use of multiple random
numbers and a multistep process of the WMS 400 and the single
random number and direct process of selecting a reel stop position
claimed by the Telnaes patent were insubstantial.164
The panel noted that means plus function claims and the
doctrine of equivalents both exist to protect patent holders, with
means plus function claims incorporating the notion of structural
equivalents into the realm of literal infringement.165 Failure to find
structure equivalent to that disclosed in a means plus function claim
would prevent a contrary finding under the doctrine of equivalents,
unless the allegedly infringing structure was based on technological
advances developed after the patent was granted.166
In this case, however, Judge Schall repeated that the accused
device did possess structure equivalent to that disclosed in the means
plus function claim.167 There was no literal infringement only because
the functions of the two devices were not identical.168 The panel
rejected WMS’s arguments that the district court had failed to
analyze equivalency on an element-by-element basis and that the
accused device did not function in substantially the same way as the
claimed invention.169 The panel then affirmed the district court’s
finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, holding

163. Id. at 1352. IGT had presented an expert witness, Jonathan Fry, who testified that there
was no substantial difference between assigning and collecting single numbers as opposed to
combinations of single numbers. See id.
164. See id. at 1353.
165. See id. (citing Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d
1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
166. See id. (quoting Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, 145 F.3d at 1310).
167. See id.
168. See id. As explained above, literal infringement of a means plus function claim requires
that (1) the function of the alleged infringing device be identical to the function claimed in the
patent, and (2) the structure of the alleged infringing device be either identical to or equivalent
to the structure claimed in the patent. See supra note 100. The district court held that selecting a
reel stop position with a single random number is structurally equivalent to selecting a reel stop
position with a random combination of single numbers, and the Federal Circuit could discern no
clear error in that holding. See id. at 1352. Thus, the second condition for literal infringement
was satisfied. See id. at 1353. The Federal Circuit held that the first condition had not been
satisfied, however, because the function of the alleged infringing device is not identical to that
which is claimed in the patent: the assignment and selection of combinations of numbers is not
identical to the assignment and selection of single numbers. See id. at 1352.
169. See id. at 1353-54.

KANDARA

912

01/18/01 4:54 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:887

that to infringe a means plus function claim under the doctrine of
equivalents an accused device and the claimed device need not have
identical functions but only substantially the same function.170
IV. THE EFFECT OF WMS GAMING ON THE APPLICATION OF THE
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS TO MEANS PLUS FUNCTION CLAIMS
The WMS Gaming decision clarifies the jurisprudence of the
doctrine of equivalents as it relates to patent claims written in means
plus function language.171 Earlier decisions finding infringement
where the function of an accused device was only substantially the
same as that claimed by the patent, such as Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
172
United States, were decided before the courts required element-byelement analysis173 and eliminated recourse to the doctrine of
equivalents when a device found not to be a structural equivalent
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6 is based on a technology known at the
time the patent issued.174 As a patent claim element written in means
plus function language can often be written in a generic manner to
claim also functions insubstantially different from those actually
recited in the patent specification, the logic of Chiuminatta would
suggest that the doctrine of equivalents would not extend the
protection provided by the literal language of the patent.175 By
holding instead that there need not be identity of function for
infringement to be found under the doctrine of equivalents for a
means plus function claim, the WMS Gaming court preserved the
traditional understanding of the doctrine that has prevailed at least
since Graver Tank: that it exists to protect the patentee from
“unimportant and insubstantial changes and substitutions.”176

170. See id.
171. Of course, the decision could also be interpreted as a reflection of the differences
between inventions in the mechanical and computer software areas. See Tobi Carver Clinton,
Infringement and Software Claimed Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6: Software Function is the
Important Part, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 64 & n.111 (2000).
172. 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983), discussed supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
173. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39-40 (1997).
174. See Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 131011 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (declining to apply the doctrine of equivalents “where the equivalence issue
does not involve later-developed technologies”).
175. See id. at 1311 (“[G]iven the prior knowledge of the [function] asserted to be
equivalent, it could readily have been disclosed in the patent.”).
176. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
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There are several reasons why the WMS Gaming court’s decision
to preserve the traditional requirement that the function of an
accused device need be only substantially the same as, rather than
identical to, the function recited in the patent claim strikes an
appropriate balance between protecting the rights of patent holders
and preserving the public notice function of patent claims. First, the
doctrine of equivalents is an equitable remedy,177 and allowing it to
operate where the accused device has a function substantially the
same as that recited in the patent claims is the best way to promote
fundamental fairness. Recognizing that in order to do equity, courts
must occasionally “temper unsparing logic and prevent an infringer
from stealing the benefit of the invention,”178 the Supreme Court has
held for nearly a century and a half that application of the doctrine of
equivalents is the appropriate means to accomplish this goal.179 It is
clearly not fair or equitable that an inventor who has voluntarily
disclosed a valuable invention to the public can lose the protection of
a patent because of changes that are insubstantial or meaningless but
nonetheless evade the literal claims of the patent.180 In WMS Gaming,
refusal to apply the doctrine of equivalents because the
microprocessor in the WMS 400 generated sets of random numbers
rather than a single random number would have completely deprived
IGT of the value of its patent, “subordinating substance to form” and
rendering the patent itself “a hollow and useless thing.”181 Thus,
refusal to apply the doctrine of equivalents to a function substantially
equivalent to that recited in a patent claim would fail to protect the
patentee from the “unintended idea gaps which cannot be
satisfactorily filled” during the conversion from physical invention to
written patent claims.182 The WMS Gaming court realized that
fundamental fairness and equity would be promoted by protecting
patent claims written in means plus function language from accused
devices with substantially equivalent functions.
177. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
178. Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1948),
quoted in Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. at 608.
179. See Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29-30 (1997) (affirming
the role of the doctrine of equivalents in modern patent doctrine); Graver Tank & Mfg., 339
U.S. at 607 (providing the seminal discussion of the role and purpose of the doctrine of
equivalents); Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 343 (1853) (expounding the doctrine
of equivalents to secure inventors their exclusive rights).
180. See Graver Tank & Mfg., 339 U.S. at 607.
181. Id.
182. Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
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Second, following the same rule for claims written in either
structural or means plus function format simplifies application of the
doctrine of equivalents and reduces the incentive to litigate collateral
issues. A patent claim written in typical structural language is
infringed by any structure falling literally within the claim language,
but a patent claim written in means plus function language is
infringed only by exact copies of the structure recited in the
specification or structural equivalents thereof.183 Because the scope of
protection afforded structures not recited in a particular patent claim
may differ drastically depending on whether it is written in means
plus function or structural language, a court’s determination that
patent language does or does not fall within the ambit of 35 U.S.C. §
112, para. 6 can have significant consequences for both the patent
owner and the alleged infringer.184 Whether particular language
should be interpreted as a structural or a means plus function claim is
therefore a collateral issue frequently raised in patent infringement
cases.185 The distinction may seem obvious, but there is neither a rule
that the word “means” always indicates a means plus function claim
nor a requirement that a means plus function claim include the word
“means.”186 Had the WMS Gaming court held that claims written in
means plus function language were infringed solely by accused
devices with an identical function while claims written in structural
183. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
184. See William F. Lee & Eugene M. Paige, Means Plus and Step Plus Function Claims: Do
We Know Them Only When We See Them?, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 251, 251
(1998).
185. See id. at 252. Lee and Paige have collected a long list of cases involving whether or not
a claim involved means plus function language. See id. (citing Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102
F.3d 524, 530-31 (Fed. Cir. 1996); York Prod., Inc. v. Central Tractor Farm & Family Ctr., 99
F.3d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1583
(Fed. Cir. 1996); Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1535-36 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Altech
Controls Corp. v. E.I.L. Instruments, Inc., No. CIV.A.H-92-3189, 1997 WL 579179, at *5-6 (S.D.
Tex. June 6, 1997); Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Victor Co., 906 F. Supp. 798, 808 (E.D.N.Y. 1995);
Fairchild Semiconductor Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1657 (D. Wash.), aff’d
per curiam, 39 F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). They also provide evidence that there has been a
marked increase in litigation involving means plus function claims. See id. at 251 n.1 (analyzing
Westlaw database mentions of the means plus function phrase over a 15-year period); see also
ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 33, at 670-72 (discussing many of the same cases as Lee and Paige
and attempting to draw an appropriate conclusion concerning how functional claims should be
recognized).
186. See Cole, 102 F.3d at 530 (affirming the lower court ruling that the claimed
“perforation means . . . for tearing” is not a means plus function element within the meaning of
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994)); Lee & Paige, supra note 184, at 259 (stating that “the use of the word
‘means’ was not talismanic; claims containing ‘means’ may not be means-plus-function, and
claims not containing ‘means’ may be means-plus-function”).
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language continued to be infringed by accused devices with merely a
substantially similar function, litigants would have a powerful new
incentive to debate the proper construction of any claim written in
language that could be considered even remotely confusing. The
WMS Gaming court simplified application of the doctrine and
reduced the incentive to litigate collateral issues by instead holding
that the doctrine of equivalents would be applied in the same fashion
for both structural and means plus function claims.
Finally, knowledge that the doctrine of equivalents will be
applied to the function recited in means plus function claims permits
efficiency in claiming. While the Federal Circuit has long held that a
patent applicant need not list every possible means for a function
recited in the patent claim,187 failure to extend the protection of the
doctrine of equivalents to the functions recited in means plus function
claims would have the effect of forcing applicants to list not only the
function they intended to claim for their invention but also every
possible variation of that function. In WMS Gaming, the court held
that the function claimed by the language “means for selecting” and
“means for assigning” was that of selecting and assigning single
random numbers, not combinations of random numbers.188 Nor would
changing the language of the claim to something like “means for
randomly selecting a number from said plurality of assigned
numbers” have guaranteed that combinations of random numbers
would be covered by the claim.189 Absent the protection extended by
the doctrine of equivalents, the patent would probably have had to
include claims for separate functions covering selection of one
random number, selection of one combination of random numbers,
selection of multiple combinations of random numbers, and selection
of similar groups of numbers using any other method of generating
non-predetermined numbers, such as chaos functions.190 The WMS
187. See D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
188. WMS Gaming Inc. v. International Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
189. North Am. Vaccine v. American Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1575-76 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(holding that while the words “a” or “an” are generally assumed to mean one or more, in a
means plus function claim, the specification must somehow denote that the words are intended
to have more than their typical singular meanings).
190. Chaos is not random. See Georgia Institute of Technology School of Physics, What is
Chaos?, at http://www.physics.gatech.edu/chaos/tutorial/whatischaos2.htm (last modified Aug.
25, 1999) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); George T. Yurkon, Introduction to Chaos and
It’s [sic] Real World Applications, at http://www.csuohio.edu/physics/kaufman/yurkon/
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Gaming court chose to encourage efficiency in claiming, allowing
applicants to describe only the intended function of their invention
rather than every possible insubstantial variation of that function.
The decision in WMS Gaming that the function of an accused device
need be only substantially the same as, rather than identical to, the
function recited in the patent claim advances fundamental fairness
and equity, simplifies application of the doctrine by reducing the
incentive to litigate collateral issues, and promotes efficiency in
claiming.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, the judiciary has attempted to strike the
appropriate balance between protecting patent holders and ensuring
public notice of the scope of protection provided by a patent. The
existence of 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6, which incorporates notions of
structural equivalence into the analysis for literal infringement but
does not mention functional equivalence, has caused confusion
because of its overlap with the doctrine of equivalents. In response,
the circumstances in which the doctrine of equivalence may be
applied to claims written in means plus function language have been
restricted. By confirming that the doctrine of equivalents does extend
to claims written in means plus function language when the allegedly
infringing device performs only substantially the same function as is
recited in the patent claim, the Federal Circuit has halted the trend
toward more restrictions at an appropriate point and thereby ensured
that the patent grant will continue to provide meaningful protection
from infringement.

chaos.html (May 28, 1997) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). A slot machine could easily be
programmed to decrease the odds of winning and thereby increase the payoff using chaos
functions.

